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Weird Tales – Weird Worlds
The weird tale offers unique opportunities for philoso- 
phical speculation […].
S. T. Joshi
In this essay I occupy myself with two subjects or problems: 1) to what 
extent narrativity presupposes anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, 
i.e. some forms of man-centeredness and some type of man-likeness; 
I will posit that a definition of narrativity cannot be entirely free from 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism (which I will collectively call 
humanness). To argue this point, I will take a close look at the idea of 
the weird tale in order to see 2) whether its purported non- or even 
anti-humanness can be held up as a viable departure from the man-
centeredness of traditional narrative art, i.e. the manner in which 
authors such as Austen and Dickens occupy themselves with life-like and 
familiar figures and are concerned with issues to which their readers will 
readily relate and which engage their attention, elicit their emotional 
involvement, and do not leave them morally indifferent. The weird tale’s 
project (and the philosophy that infuses it) has been to shift emphasis; 
i.e. to question the supremacy of humanity in the order of things and 
to reinstitute Nature, or an unknown cosmos, in its place. Our goal here 
is to examine how viable such a project is; does the idea of narrativity 
allow this kind of shift of emphasis?
For a definition (and parameters) of narrativity I will go to Marie-
Laure Ryan and her succinct listing of elements constitutive of narrativity 
(or “conditions”). For the idea of the weird tale, I will go to studies 
by S. T. Joshi, chiefly one: The Weird Tale (1990).1 As exemplary literary 
1 S. T. Joshi has also edited numerous collections of stories by the “weird” authors 
for Penguin.
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material, I will use stories analysed by those authors that Joshi regards 
as representative for the weird genre; the six chapters of The Weird Tale 
are devoted to the genre’s six classic representatives: Arthur Machen 
(1863–1947), Lord Dunsany (1878–1957), Algernon Blackwood (1869–
1951), M. R. James (1862–1936), Ambrose Bierce (1842–1913), and 
H. P. Lovecraft (1890–1937).2
Late 19th-century fiction shows a fascination with Nature, not only 
because it offered respite from the social and political troubles of the day, 
but also because of the way it helped to redefine humanity. A Sherlock 
Holmes story, “The Speckled Band” (from 1892), will help us to usher 
in some of the issues that have to do with literary representations of 
the natural world in literary texts and the roles natural – as opposed 
to human – objects can play in a narrative. This choice may be thought 
somewhat counterproductive. By definition, a detective story (or, more 
broadly, a mystery story) excludes the possibility of other than a natural 
solution to the mystery. In particular cases, however, one is tempted 
to ask what exactly is meant by “natural.” In “The Speckled Band,” 
a snake, after (and thanks to) having undergone special training, is 
used to commit murder. This is an idea that supplies the final solution 
of the case, but also one that only vaguely presented itself to the mind 
of Sherlock Holmes. And so, the scene of discovery is here at once a scene 
of confrontation; the detective and his friend find themselves almost 
literally groping in the dark (and the reader metaphorically so) before 
they discover the “natural” culprit, which turns out to be a “swamp 
adder”: a “creature from India” (“ ‘It is a swamp adder!’ cried Holmes – 
‘the deadliest snake in India’ .”3) that has been kept in a safe, has been 
trained by the human culprit, an evil doctor, to drink milk, to “crawl” 
up and down a rope, and to respond to the sound of a whistle.4 
In the story, this odd snake is instrumental in committing what the 
villain thinks and hopes to be a perfect crime. To Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle the snake must have conveyed the idea for a perfect crime-and-
2 The most representative tales include: Machen’s “The Inmost Light” (1894), “The 
White People” (1894), “The Great God Pan” (1894); Dunsany’s “The Gods of Pegāna” 
(1905), “Time and the Gods” (1906), and “In the Land of Time” (1906); Blackwood’s 
“The Willows” (1907; according to Lovecraft “almost a model of what a weird tale ought 
to be” (in a letter), “A Descent into Egypt” (1914; from Incredible Adventures; according 
to Joshi “perhaps Blackwood’s finest single work”).
3 Arthur Conan Doyle, “The Speckled Band,” in: The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 195.
4 The snake is un-natural in two senses: 1. it has been trained to perform actions that 
are the inventions of his human owner; 2. it is of a species that has not been recorded. The 
second aspect lies outside the fictive world of the short story; within it we are expected to 
believe that it does exist (Holmes identifies it at the end of the story).
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detection story. Yet the idea is not entirely unobjectionable. The reader, 
accustomed to and led by generic conventions, certainly expected to be 
supplied with a natural solution of the mystery, but – and here pops up 
the detective-reader analogy – would not go as far as to devise an unheard-
of – perhaps un-natural – species (“the swamp adder”),5 which is exactly 
what the author has done. But the swamp adder, no matter how deadly 
in itself and by nature, as it were, represents the scope of human (both 
the culprit’s and the villain’s, albeit in different ways) interference in the 
natural world and the threats that such interference may generate. 
“The Speckled Band” may be compared to that famous story about 
“doctor” Frankenstein and his uncanny experimentation. Clearly, 
a creature belonging to the order of Nature, no matter how deadly in 
itself and “by nature,” has sustained here an odd deformation to suit 
and realise the perverse purposes of its human owner. Sherlock Holmes 
is convinced – and has no difficulty in convincing us – that a medical 
doctor (or any natural scientist), when his thoughts turn towards evil, is 
the most dangerous of criminals.6 Conan Doyle does not explain why, 
but surely the reader can easily figure this out for herself. 
The definition of literary weirdness derives from H. P. Lovecraft, who 
in his Supernatural Horror in Literature describes the weird tale as a type of 
“fear-literature.” Lovecraft goes on to say that the genre’s aim is to convey 
“the true sense of the morbidly unnatural.” “The literature of cosmic fear 
in its purest sense” has to have in it “a certain atmosphere of breathless 
and unexplainable dread of outer, unknown forces must be present; and 
there must be a hint […] of that most terrible conception of the human 
brain – a malign and particular suspension or defeat of those fixed laws 
of Nature which are our only safeguard against the assaults of chaos and 
the dæmons of unplumbed space.”7 These and similar statements make it 
clear that the weird tale is un-natural: supernatural, extra-natural, perhaps 
even counter-natural. They also express the idea that the weird tale is 
5 In the words of the Norton editor of the Sherlock Holmes stories: “The identity 
of the breed of snake termed a ‘swamp adder’ by Holmes – a name by which no snake 
is commonly known – is debated widely, and no candidate seems to possess all of the 
characteristics described.” The New Annotated Sherlock Holmes, ed. Leslie S. Klinger (New 
York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), vol. 1, p. 259 (appendix to the 
story).
6 “‘Ah, me! it’s a wicked world, and when a clever man turns his brain to crime it is 
the worst of all.’” And then: “When a doctor does go wrong, he is the first of criminals.” 
Holmes is the speaker in both these cases. Conan Doyle, “The Speckled Band,” pp. 189 
and 192. 
7 Quoted in S. T. Joshi, The Weird Tale (Holicong: Wildside Press, 1990), p. 6 
(“Introduction”). In weird tales, the “brain” would be the mind of the narrator, and thus 
what matters is what it asserts as a fact.
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decidedly and essentially counter-human; its defining movement is away 
from a man-centred and man-friendly world and towards a nightmarish 
one, a world inhabited by demons, a world that from our limited 
perspective is an anarchic chaos rather than a laws-obeying cosmos. 
A “weird” author steps beyond the reality as defined by, and operating 
according to, “fixed laws of Nature.” There is, besides, the suggestion 
that those laws have been devised as a “safeguard” against “chaos” and 
“demons.” In other words, the world that we inhabit (and the idea of 
Nature in general) is a reflection of human concerns (fears, basically and 
ultimately), and thus may have little to do with the “unplumbed space,” 
the “great beyond” out there; they are anthropomorphic in that they 
reflect, not so much Nature and the laws that govern it, as our anxieties 
or our despair at not being able to know and govern it. The cosmos may 
have been explored, but has not been penetrated or “plumbed.”8 Weird 
narratives offer us glimpses into a reality that perhaps is more real than 
the cosy but insignificant and brittle daylight world that we inhabit.9
The principal movement in a weird tale is thus eccentric;10 a weird 
author’s goal is to destabilise (perhaps even to undermine and negate) the 
central position that the human being (humanity) has occupied so far, 
i.e. as an entity (race) towards whom the cosmos gravitates and whom 
all things serve. The weird tale is thus programmatically cosmo- rather 
than anthropocentric; the spirit that animates literary weirdness can be 
described as counter-anthropocentric, in the ontological sense.11 There are 
 8 “To plumb” is “to examine,” or “to probe” and specifically “to be able to 
understand something that seems mysterious or perplexing” (adapted from dictionaries 
made available by the Microsoft word processor).
 9 As critics have described it, Lovecraft’s stance has involved a denial of the 
supernatural in its traditional man-centred sense: “the focus of supernatural dread [has 
been transferred] from man and his little world and his gods, to the stars and the black 
and unplumbed gulfs of intergalactic space.” Fritz Leiber, “A Literary Copernicus” (1949), 
quoted in S. T. Joshi, A Subtler Magic. The Writings and Philosophy of H. P. Lovecraft 
(Berkeley Heights: Wildside Press, 1999), p. 137. Joshi comments: “by simply having his 
entities come from some remote corner of the universe, he [Lovecraft] could attribute 
nearly any physical properties to them and not be required to give a plausible explanation 
for them” (same page). The question of course remains: What manner of entities?
10 Eccentricity in its original and etymological sense is related to astronomy; 
“eccentric” means “out of the centre.” Hence the suggestion of deviation from norm, 
rule or custom, as in the case of an eccentric person.
11 Hence the term “cosmicism”; see S. T. Joshi, A Dreamer and a Visionary. H. P. 
Lovecraft and His Time (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), p. 182. Here Joshi 
distinguishes the following aspects of Lovecraft’s philosophy: “Cosmicism is at once 
a metaphysical position (an awareness of the vastness of the universe in both space 
and time), an ethical position (an awareness of the insignificance of human beings 
within the realm of the universe), and an aesthetic position (a literary expression of this 
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no ties of kinship or friendship that bind man and Nature; the so-called 
laws of Nature, because they are in themselves anthropocentric, will not 
protect man from the unknown – and possibly sinister – forces (energies, 
entities, etc.). Because of our irreparable ignorance, we may suspect that 
those forces may not – will perhaps refuse to – obey those laws. The weird 
tale is a narrative in which we witness (and which recounts) a suspension 
of the so-called “laws of Nature” as we know it (them). At some point 
in the narrative we observe Nature’s refusal to play by the rules, so to 
speak. 
In a classic tale of this kind, “The Willows” (1907)12 by Blackwood, 
the trees named in the title turn into (rather, turn out to be) sinister, 
indeed life-threatening, beasts of some sort. This is how the narrator 
attempts to convey his sense of their uncanniness:
With this multitude of willows, however, it was something far 
different, I felt. Some essence emanated from them that besieged 
the heart. Some sense of awe awakened, true, but of awe touched 
somewhere by a vague horror. (section I)
Soon enough, something like an actual assault on the two travellers 
along the desolate banks of the Danube (the story’s “natural” setting) 
occurs:
There, in front of the dim glow, something was moving.
I saw it through a veil that hung before my eyes like the gauze 
drop-curtain used at the back of a theater – hazily a little. It 
was neither a human figure nor an animal. To me it gave the 
strange impression of being as large as several animals grouped 
together, like horses, two or three, moving slowly. The Swede 
[the narrator’s companion], too, got a similar result, though 
expressing it differently, for he thought it was shaped and sized 
like a clump of willow bushes, rounded at the top, and moving 
all over upon its surface – “coiling upon itself like smoke,” he 
said afterwards. […]
I gave one terrified glance, which just enabled me to see that 
the shadowy form was swinging towards us through the bushes, 
and then I collapsed backwards with a crash into the branches. 
insignificance, to be effected by the minimizing of human character and the display of 
the titanic gulfs of space and time.” 
12 An electronic version of the text can be found at the Gutenberg Project website 
(www.gutenberg.org). This is the source for my quotations. 
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[…] I was conscious only of a sort of enveloping sensation of icy 
fear that plucked the nerves out of their fleshly covering, twisted 
them this way and that, and replaced them quivering. My eyes 
were tightly shut; something in my throat choked me; a feeling 
that my consciousness was expanding, extending out into space, 
swiftly gave way to another feeling that I was losing it altogether, 
and about to die. (section III)
The element of threat from the unknown forces, lurking in the natural 
objects that surround the two human protagonists, becomes more and 
more real, no matter how difficult it is for the narrator – for the reasons 
that we have already hinted at – to say where exactly the threat resides or 
what exactly causes him to be terrified. The gradual progress of whatever 
lurks in nature (“the willows” in this particular case, in their anti-human 
alliance with the river) to the position of eventual ascendency – this is 
what sums up the direction of the narrative; this is where Blackwood 
is headed, so to speak. To put this differently, the story is devised as 
an exemplification of one of the protagonist’s beliefs, his intuitions of 
weirdness, as we might address them. Early in the story, he communicates 
them to his companion in this manner:
“All my life,” he said, “I have been strangely, vividly conscious 
of another region – not far removed from our own world in one 
sense, yet wholly different in kind – where great things go on 
unceasingly, where immense and terrible personalities hurry by, 
intent on vast purposes compared to which earthly affairs, the 
rise and fall of nations, the destinies of empires, the fate of armies 
and continents, are all as dust in the balance; […].”
What will occupy us for the remainder of this essay is the 
relation between literary and ontological weirdness, with the latter’s 
implications for morals. Lovecraft’s definitions expose the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of literary weirdness. Again, these two 
aspects are in correspondence. In terms of ontology, the world – “Nature” 
out there – is not what we, benighted mortals, think it to be. In terms of 
epistemology, because we are benighted mortals, the world (“the cosmos,” 
a term Lovecraft prefers to “nature,” perhaps due to its man-alienating 
tenor) must remain a riddle for us.13 For the sake of simplicity and to 
13 As Joshi sees this, epistemology comes before ontology in a genre that he calls 
“quasi science fiction,” and which “implies that that the ‘supernatural’ is not ontological 
but epistemological: it is only our ignorance of certain ‘natural laws’ that creates the 
illusion of supernaturalism” (Joshi, The Weird Tale, p. 7; Joshi’s emphasis). Joshi uses the 
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acknowledge the parentage of the idea, I will henceforth refer to this 
sense of weirdness as “cosmic weirdness.” The weird tale in this way 
enlarges reality in proportion to the way it diminishes man’s cognitive 
capacity. The question now is, to what extent the weird tale is like any 
other tale. Rephrased in the jargon of narrative theory, the question is 
this: Do tales that contain an element of cosmic weirdness and that 
depict the manifestation of cosmic weirdness (bring cosmic weirdness to 
appearance, as we might also put it) conform to some basic principles of 
narrativity? What exactly is literary weirdness?
Already at the outset we can be more specific about “some basic 
principles” and narrow the problem down to humanness as an 
(indispensable?) element of narrativity. A narrative that belongs to the 
realistic convention is not only man-oriented but also fulfils the basic 
condition that appertains to the plausibility of the natural world. In 
the case of a weird tale, the categories of the possible, the probable, the 
plausible, the verisimilar – i.e. categories that we customarily apply to 
realistic fiction – fail to apply.14 The world of a Sherlock Holmes story 
conforms – and conforms out of principle – to the realistic condition 
of naturality; the detective’s motto and principal method is to “exhaust 
all natural explanations” of the mystery.15 A snake serving as a death-
term “quasi science fiction” to describe “Lovecraft’s work” (p. 9). As distinct from fantasy 
(represented by Dunsany), the weird tale of the Lovecraftian type has the goal, in Joshi’s 
phrasing, “to inspire the sentiment of ontological horror” (ibidem). As at least one, 
perhaps even a major, source of this type of horror, we can name the radical and consistent 
naturalness of cosmicism, i.e. the elimination of any kind of “supernaturalism.”
14 As stated in Sherlock Holmes’s maxim, “when you have excluded the impossible, 
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” Arthur Conan Doyle, “The 
Beryl Coronet,” in: The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, p. 268.
15 “Of course, if […] we are dealing with forces outside the ordinary laws of Nature, 
there is an end of our investigation. But we are bound to exhaust all other hypotheses 
before falling back upon this one.” Arthur Conan Doyle, The Hound of the Baskervilles 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 27–28. In this chapter of 
the Hound novella, Conan Doyle addresses the problem of “supernaturalism.” The basic 
resemblance – with regard to how animate nature is used to commit crime – between “The 
Speckled Band” and The Hound is obvious. The respective culprits have a lot in common; 
Stapleton is introduced to the reader as a “naturalist” (18). Doctor Mortimer, another 
man of science, describes himself, self-effacingly, through an allusion to Newton’s often-
quoted words: “a picker up of shells on the shores of the great unknown ocean” (p. 8). 
In the 1831 edition of Frankenstein we read in Victor’s confession: “I have described 
myself as always having been embued with a fervent longing to penetrate the secrets of 
nature. […] I always came from my studies discontented and unsatisfied. Sir Isaac Newton 
is said to have avowed that he felt like a child picking up shells beside the great and 
unexplored ocean of truth.” Mary Shelley, Frankenstein. The 1818 Text (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 210 (chapter 2). This may illustrate that the idea 
of “unplumbed cosmos” was not entirely Lovecraft’s invention; however, Lovecraft’s idea 
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inflicting implement may be an odd thing, but the “swamp adder” is 
(said to be) a thing of nature, inasmuch as India, “exotic” and remote 
as it may be (geographically, culturally, and “biologically”) from Western 
civilisation, is a part of the world as we know it.16 In a sharp contrast 
to a typical mystery story of the detective type, the weird tale makes 
us question our very idea of what is natural; we are made to explore 
another side of nature, usually, of course, a sinister or openly hostile 
one, to contemplate (or admit) the possibility that Nature is not a man-
friendly habitat. This, on the other hand, in a Sherlock Holmes story is 
inconceivable, because the investigation only makes sense if the laws of 
Nature are and remain inviolate. The first and basic rule for the detective 
is, logically, to exhaust all possibilities of solving the mystery without 
recourse to supernatural, preternatural or otherwise otherworldly agency: 
“The world is big enough for us. No ghosts need apply.”17
What do we mean when we speak of narrativity and its defining features 
or functions? Here we shall use a shortcut and avail ourselves of a ready-
to-hand definition supplied by Marie-Laure Ryan in her contribution 
to The Cambridge Companion to Narrative. Ryan names the following 
eight features (she uses the word “conditions,” which makes explicit the 
normative aspect of her definition) as constitutive of narrativity (I do not 
use quotation marks to avoid confusion):
1. Narrative must be about a world populated by individuated 
existents. 
2. This world must be situated in time and undergo significant 
transformations. 
3. The transformations must be caused by non-habitual physical 
events. 
4. Some of the participants in the events must be intelligent 
agents who have a mental life and react emotionally to the 
states of the world. 
5. Some of the events must be purposeful actions by these 
agents.
of ontological weirdness admits the possibility of a world in which laws of “our” world 
do not obtain, a world which is no longer Nature. 
16 There is a degree of tension between the two perspectives: ontological and 
epistemological. What we (readers) regard as natural (located within the system called 
Nature) depends on our knowledge of the world. To posit the scientific “picture” of the 
world as a standard for what “we” understand as Nature is problematic: How many 
readers are scientists? 
17 Arthur Conan Doyle, “The Sussex Vampire,” in: The Case-Book of Sherlock Holmes 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 73.
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6. The sequence of events must form a unified causal chain and 
lead to closure.
7. The occurrence of at least some of the events must be asserted 
as fact for the storyworld.
8. The story must communicate something meaningful to the 
audience.18
Some of Ryan’s features or “conditions” are not directly related to the 
issue in hand; others are, or at least seem to be. On the whole, Ryan has 
made some effort to cleanse her definition of narrativity of suggestions of 
anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. Thus, only the last condition 
(8) is overtly anthropocentric: Stories must be about things that are not 
indifferent to their readers, an idea that makes the human recipient 
into something like a hub or axis of narrative gravitation. At the same 
time, this condition is “pragmatic” and thus extratextual in that it does 
not concern, unlike all the other ones, the content (in a broad sense 
of the term) of stories, i.e. what stories should be about.19 Moreover, 
depending on the understanding of the unhelpfully broad meaning of 
the term “meaningful,” condition 8 might be seen as a gesture towards 
an engagement with moral issues that readers expect in stories; we do not 
wish to read stories that leave us morally indifferent to what they depict. 
We shall return to this possibility towards the end of this essay.
In my opinion, Ryan’s effort to avoid explicit humanness is largely 
misspent. Anthropomorphism peeps out despite the repeated attempts 
at its concealment. To make this distinct, I rephrase the conditions so as 
to reveal the assumptions to do with an idea of humanness behind the 
seemingly “clean” (broader than human) list of conditions:
a. The story world must be populated by human beings or beings 
(individuals) that have the basic features of humanity (chiefly: the 
capacity to act freely, intelligence, and emotional responsiveness; as 
stipulated below). 
b. Significant events and states of affair that make up the story must be 
asserted as real and concern (be of significance to and elicit emotional 
18 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” in: The Cambridge Companion 
to Narrative, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 29–30. 
Ryan groups the conditions into the following four dimensions: “spatial” (1), “temporal” 
(2 and 3), “mental” (4 and 5), and “formal and pragmatic” (6, 7, and 8).
19 Condition 7 sounds slightly problematic, because it is not clear who should perform 
the task of asserting. In my opinion, in order for a story to work, and in particular, in 
order that it might fulfil condition 8, both the characters and the readers must be sure 
that it is not (not entirely at least) about imaginary events and agents but ones that are 
real within the ontological parameters of the fictive world projected by the story.
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response from) the human beings that inhabit the storyworld; some 
of these events must be brought about by these beings acting as free 
and intelligent agents.20 
c. Significant events must succeed one another (on the plane of “story” 
or fabula) and be connected causally; events brought about by human 
agency must be part of this causal chain. 
To restate the opinion already expressed, this reformulation of the 
features of narrativity does not do violence to the basic insights expressed 
in Ryan’s definition. The main purpose has been to remove the ambiguity 
inherent in the ultimately futile attempt to conceal or perhaps altogether 
cancel (shut out) the orientation of narrativity to humanness. It should 
now be obvious that an idea of what it means to be a human being (note 
the three features in a. above) permeates Ryan’s definition, and it is my 
belief that it simply makes more sense to accept and disclose it rather 
than deny and conceal it. 
The proposed reformulation (a reinsertion of anthropocentrism and 
anthropomorphism) does not cancel what Ryan has evidently wished to 
leave as an open possibility; that there can be stories that are not about 
people but about some other types of beings or creatures; and that we 
can and do find such stories meaningful (capable of engaging our moral 
sentiments) and entertaining. I am ready to agree that we need to go 
beyond “people,” but at the same time I am prepared to insist that we 
cannot go beyond “human” or – more awkwardly – “man-like.” A fable 
by Aesop, to reach for a simple but not necessarily simplistic example, is 
meaningful (instructive) and entertaining because we easily see (a human 
element) through the veil of beast allegory. A story about the sinking 
of the Titanic summed up as “ship hits iceberg – ship sinks – people 
drown” does not meet the condition of purposeful involvement (point 
b.). If the script for the 1997 film Titanic is to supply us with illustrative 
material, then a summary of it, let alone close examination, will soon 
reveal that the story is not really about the catastrophe. This and similar 
disaster stories are about human interactions, to which some dramatic 
20 What we mean by human agency in the strict and narrow sense of the term is 
behaviour that is non-habitual. Breathing as different from smoking is habitual and does 
not involve agency while smoking (even though it is a habit) does. To stop breathing 
is a decision and thus an instance of agency; similarly to the “operation” that can be 
described as non-smoking (the decision to refrain from smoking, e.g. by a habitual 
smoker). It is obvious that we cannot describe agency in this sense to the “swamp 
adder” or the “spectral hound,” and the murderous actions (largely habitual, reflecting 
the training at the hands of the culprit) that these creatures perform must be traced back 
to a human agent to be made sense of, i.e. to be understood as an action, an event that 
in this sense is unnatural.
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events (brought about by “natural” forces, operating beyond human 
control) serve as a backdrop; they meet the conditions of narrativity only 
insofar as there is space in them, no matter how small, for emotional 
responsiveness, intellectual involvement, and goal-pursuing agency. By 
the same token, a zombie story must contain, besides the usual monsters 
that have retained only the vestiges of humanity (some sort of blind, 
dogged purposiveness), human agents and depict interactions between 
them.21 Because of this, a zombie film or story will be quite like a typical 
disaster film or story; indeed, zombification is usually a by-product of 
some disaster.
Let us now return to literary and ontological weirdness in order to 
see if there are areas of possible disagreement between our definition of 
narrativity and the weird tale. Does this definition admit of weirdness? 
Does it exclude it? Does it imply an ontology of non-weird worlds and 
impose limitations on the extent of weirdness permissible in a story? 
What is the relation (is it one of accord, discord or indifference) between 
weirdness and humanness? Finally, what are we supposed to do with 
the moral interest of stories, exactly the aspect that weird authors 
programmatically ignore?
Our definition of narrativity stipulates that human agency is required 
as a condition for narrativity; stories must posit individualised and freely 
acting “existents,” equipped with intelligence and capable of a range of 
emotional responses. The literary material in hand suggests the possibility 
that existents represented as other than human are endowed with features 
of humaneness. Conan Doyle’s “swamp adder” can be interpreted as an 
extension (instrument, prosthesis) of human agency, which to an extent 
justifies the otherwise preposterous idea of “enriching” Nature with 
a species whose only raison d’être seems to be to assist in the execution 
of someone’s evil designs. The story’s villain is the source of the element 
of unnaturalness; he has trained the snake so as to be able to act through 
it. To this extent the snake has ceased to be natural, having been warped 
by a human (inhuman?) proclivity toward evil. 
How different is the situation in a typical weird tale such as “The 
Willows”? For one thing, in “The Speckled Band,” regardless of the 
element of weirdness inherent in the snake, a person is the centre of 
21 For precisely the same reasons, the Frankenstein monster, although an early (in 
terms of literary history) reanimated corpse, meets the criteria of humanness: intelligence, 
emotional responsiveness, and non-habitual agency. This, paradoxically, makes it possible 
for him to turn into a monster in the moral sense of the word, i.e. to stifle his benevolence 
and turn into a fiend (a kind of a psychopath, to use contemporary parlance): “I could 
with pleasure have destroyed the cottage and its inhabitants, and have glutted myself with 
their shrieks and misery.” Shelley, Frankenstein, p. 111. 
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agency (and of narrative interest). This is not the case in “The Willows,” 
where the principal agent is a non-human existent, i.e. willows. In other 
sample tales, their place is occupied by Egypt, deities of nature, gods from 
outer space, ghosts and demons. While in a “weird” Sherlock Holmes 
story human agents (good and evil) shape the course of events, in a weird 
tale human characters are cast in the roles of victims; are more acted 
upon than acting (to rephrase King Lear’s line about being “more sinned 
against than sinning”). For this reason, the weird tale is permeated by 
animism and may be seen as an expression of (and a relapse into) the 
childlike belief that inanimate objects are endowed with human features. 
This, however, does not remove humanness; a childlike world-picture is 
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric to such an extent that it does not 
admit of Nature as a reality devoid of human features. But we must not 
forget about the element that for Lovecraft was constitutive of ontological 
(and by implication also of literary) weirdness, that of “cosmic dread.” 
This brings us to the condition of narrativity that, as we have suggested, 
a definition such as that put forth by Ryan – in a rather miscalculated 
attempt at objectivity (read: non-humanness) – leaves aside. 
The disturbing deficiency of our definition of narrativity is that it 
excludes the moral dimension. We have already made this observation. 
This was an important concern for “weird” authors (what Joshi calls 
Lovecraft’s ethical position, an integral part of his cosmicism). Their 
comprehensive, liberal or simply open notion of Nature has caused 
them to disallow unnaturalness. In the words of one of Blackwood’s 
characters, “There is nothing anywhere – unnatural.”22 In a rephrasing by 
Joshi, “all phenomena are equally ‘natural’ parts of the cosmos.”23 This, 
I think, is what is truly weird about literary weirdness; the response of the 
reader (as expected by the authors) is inadequate. Lovecraft’s consistent 
“cosmicism” is, as we have seen, materialistic; there is no room for the 
supernatural and it is thus logically eliminated. The term “supernormal” 
has been proposed; as Joshi explains: “It is only our ignorance of certain 
‘natural laws’ that creates the illusion of supernaturalism.”24 The weird 
tale – it would seem – elicits a change of perspective in the reader, which 
will allow him/her to embrace the possibility that chaos can ultimately 
be another type of cosmos. 
Joshi is right in saying that the weird tale opens interesting opportun- 
ities for philosophising, but the manner in which this genre excludes 
a moral dimension should give us pause. The weird tale makes conspicuous 
22 From Pan’s Garden (1912), quoted in Joshi, The Weird Tale, p. 104. 
23 Joshi, The Weird Tale, p. 104.
24 Joshi, The Weird Tale, p. 7; already quoted.
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the way in which the distinction between “natural” and “unnatural” can 
be eliminated from our understanding of narrativity. The idea of “cosmic 
fear” suggests that what weird stories depict is inimical to humanity; fear, 
however, is an instinctive, and therefore natural, response to whatever 
poses a threat to life as we know and value it. The idea of the unnatural 
(as well as that of the inhuman) has thus a significant pragmatic (and, by 
implication, also moral) function, regardless of how problematic it may 
sound semantically. The story of the Frankenstein monster, sad as it is, is 
a story about the human instinctual elimination of all that looks inhuman; 
it is, in other words, a story about our innate anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism.
Ontological weirdness is not really about the laws of Nature, but about 
moral laws, to the extent to which these correspond to Nature. Morality, 
however, ceases to make sense if Nature “acts” in ways that to us seem 
incomprehensible. Weirdness thus seems to be about unnaturalness in 
the moral sense, and this is simply what we mean by evil. As a point of 
departure – and a constraint to be overcome – the weird tale posits a close 
connection (interdependence: kinship, friendliness) between Nature and 
man; this (romantically) is a source of morality, as in Wordsworth.25 
Going beyond Nature, extending its idea (embracing the cosmic and the 
external or “eccentric”) means going beyond the here and now and the 
present-day moral constraints. This explains the historical connection 
between literary weirdness and decadence, with Machen’s Great God 
Pan26 as a symbol of it and emphasised by Joshi’s connection between 
Lovecraft and the “Decline of the West.”27
Yet going beyond moral constraints does not entail (in ontological 
terms) going beyond a human-type of agency (as described); it actually 
presupposes it. The weird tale is perhaps best defined as an attempt to go 
beyond the inherent and essential humanness of narrativity, to “plumb” 
what lies out there. The important lesson is that there is no escape from 
humanness. The Frankenstein monster is “borne away by the waves, and 
lost in darkness and distance.” His misery consists in the impossibility, 
25 In his “Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth describes himself as “well pleased to recognise / 
In nature and the language of the sense, / The anchor of [his] purest thoughts, the nurse, / 
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul / Of all my moral being.” 
26 “[O]ne of his first works of fiction of this period – ‘The Great God Pan’ (1890) 
– created a sensation, especially when it appeared in book form in 1894. It shocked 
the moral guardians of an enfeebled Victorian culture as the diseased outpourings of 
a decadent mind; […].” S. T. Joshi, “Introduction,” in: Arthur Machen, ‘The White People’ 
and Other Weird Stories (Penguin Books, 2011), p. xii.
27 Joshi entitled the copious chapter on Lovecraft in The Weird Tale “H. P. Lovecraft: 
The Decline of the West.”
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when alive, to shed humanness. His yearning for interaction (as a cure 
to insufferable solitude) is perhaps the concealed reason why the story 
he tells Victor is absurdly long, given the circumstances. We know well 
that for him there is no escape into a world that is non-human; nor is 
there any for the weird tale. Childishness aside, the questions are: What 
meaningfully human aspects do Blackwood’s willows, Machen’s Pan, 
James’s ghosts, and Lovecraft’s antediluvian gods convey? What do the 
weird tales tell us, not about cosmos, but about us?
Jacek Mydla
Osobliwe opowieści – osobliwe światy
Streszczenie
Artykuł podejmuje temat tzw. opowieści osobliwej (ang. weird tale), gatunku opowie-
ści zdefiniowanego po raz pierwszy przez H. P. Lovecrafta i poddanego systematycznemu 
opracowaniu w publikacjach S. T. Joshiego (np. The Weird Tale). W związku z progra-
mowym anty-antropocentryzmem opowieści osobliwej, rodzi się pytanie, czy i w jakim 
stopniu narratywność (narrativity) dopuszcza redukcję czynnika ludzkiego. Na podsta-
wie zaproponowanej definicji narratywności wytyczone zostają w artykule granice takiej 
redukcji lub – innymi słowy – określona zostaje nieredukowalność czynnika ludzkiego 
(moralnego) w opowieści jako takiej.
Jacek Mydla
Seltsame Geschichten – seltsame Welten
Zusammenfassung
Das Thema des Essays ist sog. seltsame Geschichte (engl.: weird tale), eine zum ersten 
Mal von H. P. Lovecraft definierte und von S. T. Joshi in dessen Publikationen (z.B.: The 
Weird Tale) systematisch erforschte Romangattung. Da ein seltsamer Roman grundsätz-
lich antianthropomorphisch ist, muss man sich eine Frage stellen, inwieweit die Narrativi-
tät (narrativity) die Reduzierung des menschlichen Faktors zulässt. Anhand der Definition 
von der Narrativität wird die Unreduzierbarkeit des menschlichen (moralischen) Faktors 
in dem Roman an sich bestimmt.
